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Introduction 
Ajit Mishra and Andrew Samuel 
A unifying theme that emerges from this collection of articles on corruption is best reflected in 
an anecdote about bribery among “jeepney” taxi drivers in the Philippines, related by Sevalleno 
and co-authors. These taxi drivers often have to bribe officials in order to avoid being fined for 
real or “made-up” violations of the law. This process of bribery involves physical threats to 
themselves or their passengers as they negotiate these bribes. Further, their ability to make a 
living to provide for their family also becomes vulnerable since their license to operate may be 
suspended unless they pay these bribes. In this situation, taxi drivers are forced to balance 
concerns regarding the safety of their passengers and responsibility to their family against the 
ethicality of bribery. What this anecdote reveals is that choosing whether or not to bribe is not a 
“black and white” ethical decision with clear moral guidelines. Instead, the decision to engage in 
corrupt activities often involves competing moral claims over an individual.  This then is the 
common thread that unites this collection of articles on corruption. 
Dungan et. al. investigate this issue from the perspective of  “behavioral psychology” and 
provide broad evidence of this notion of competing moral claims regarding the choice to behave 
corruptly. Their paper reviews their own research and others in this field, to examine the internal 
psychological mechanisms and cognitive processes that take place when individuals participate 
in corrupt activities. Some consistent themes that emerge from this literature are that, when it 
comes to corruption, people are moral hypocrites. That is, while they are ready to judge others 
for violating moral norms (with regard to corruption), they readily overlook those same 
considerations when their own interests are at stake. However, this selfishness is not naïve, and it 
is often motivated by a drive to better serve the interests of their own “in” group. 
The evidence that best describes this tension between “in” group versus “out” group loyalty 
comes from a series of studies on the “Whistleblower’s Dilemma”. In these studies participants 
were asked to recall a time when they witnessed unethical behavior and had to decide whether to 
report the crime or to keep quiet. They found that participants who chose to report the crime 
were ten times more likely to use words that related to fairness and justice when asked to 
describe their reason for reporting. In contrast, participants who chose to remain silent were 
twice as likely to use words related to loyalty when describing their reason for remaining silent. 
To examine this moral “trade-off” between loyalty and fairness more closely, researchers posed 
questions to participants in order to compute a fairness score and a loyalty score for participants. 
Participants were then given a series of hypothetical scenarios in which they could choose to 
whistle blow or remain silent. Crucially, it turns out that the decision to whistle blow depends on 
the difference between the loyalty and fairness scores, although each of these scores by itself 
does not predict the decision to whistle blow. Related studies involving non-hypothetical 
scenarios in an online community also confirm that the relative valence of competing moral 
commitments (such as, loyalty vs. fairness) is what determines whether a decision is driven 
primarily by fairness, which leads to less corruption, or by loyalty, which can lead to more 
corruption. 
While Dungan et al.’s claims regarding the influence of loyalty over fairness come primarily 
from controlled behavioral studies, Sevillano et al. provide complementary evidence for this 
phenomenon from the field. Their study involving “jeepney” drivers shows that drivers are 
keenly aware of the ethical tension between providing for their family and ensuring the safety of 
their passengers and choosing not to pay a bribe. Thus, the laboratory evidence regarding this 
internal conflict is clearly manifested in the experience of these drivers.  
Sevallino et al. focus on the decisions of the Jeepney drivers (the bribe payers) and do not study 
the ethicality of bribery from the perspective of the officials who demand bribes. However, they 
do note that the officials who demand bribes often use intermediaries to facilitate the bribe 
transactions. Previous experimental research by Drugov, Hamman, and Serra (2011) studies the 
role of intermediaries in facilitating corrupt transactions. They find that because employing an 
intermediary shifts responsibility for the act of bribery away from the individual to the 
intermediary, the moral cost associated with bribery for the individual is lowered. Thus, hiring an 
intermediary to act as an agent serves to reduce the moral dilemma associated with bribery. In 
light of this, it is interesting to speculate whether the officials who extort money from Jeepney 
drivers also face an ethical dilemma when demanding bribes, and whether they use 
intermediaries in order to reduce the moral cost of demanding a bribe.  
While Dungan et al.  and Sevallino et al. focus on empirical evidence regarding the thought 
processes that are associated with the ethicality of bribery, Elizabeth Barret focuses on the 
related legal ambiguity. Her article poses the question, “Are some bribes more harmful than 
others?” and highlights the fact that even laws proscribing corruption and bribery recognize that 
there is a “moral gradation” to bribes, with some being more harmful to society than others. Her 
focus is primarily on the implementation of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) which prohibits US companies from paying bribes when conducting business overseas. 
She points out that the laws (and their enforcement) send conflicting messages about the 
ethicality of bribes. For e.g. the FCPA allows bribes that are simply made as “facilitation 
payments”, that is, paid for something to which the  company is entitled, as opposed to bribes 
paid to obtain an “unfair advantage”. Thus, the legal-institutional structure recognizes the fact 
that there are different types of bribes, some of which are more harmful than others. From a 
consequentialist/utilitarian framework, this implies that some bribes should, therefore, be 
considered “more illegal” that others. While such a distinction may be useful, the thrust of her 
argument is that all forms of bribery “undermine the rule of law” and, therefore, are harmful. 
Thus, she argues that it is not always useful to distinguish between these different types of 
bribes. 
It is worth reflecting on Barret’s argument in light of the evidence presented by Sevalleno et al. 
Arguably, the bribes paid by “jeepney” drivers do not provide them with any unfair advantage – 
yet as the readers of this article will find, the system of bribery clearly undermines the rule of 
law “on the street”. The final paper in this series “Does Reporting Decrease Corruption?” (Bone 
and Spengler) is a game theoretic model that studies the interaction between a citizen and an 
official where the citizen attempts to bribe the official in exchange for a favor. The authors’ main 
focus is to study the impact of penalties for paying and receiving a bribe, as well as policies that 
reward officials for reporting instances of bribery. Their firs result is that stricter penalties for 
briber payers increases the probability of bribery, while increasing the penalty for bribe 
recipients (officials) reduces the probability of bribery. They also find, rather counterintuitively, 
that increasing the reward for reporting bribery can actually increase the equilibrium level of 
bribery.  
Many anti-corruption campaigns have recently tried to focus on improving the “civic virtues” of 
being an honest official or citizen in order to increase the moral costs of giving and receiving a 
bribe. In light of this and the other papers in this series, an interesting question to pose here is 
whether one can interpret the penalties in Bone and Spengler as moral costs. If one can take such 
liberties, then it suggests that instilling a sense of moral duty in officials will not necessarily have 
the same impact on corruption as instilling those costs among citizens. Future experimental 
studies may find it valuable to pursue this line of research. 
It is worth concluding then by pointing out that there is much to be gained by assimilating the 
traditional analysis of bribery, which focuses on the external environmental factors such as 
penalties, organizational structures and incentives, with the internal, intrinsic, and cognitive 
processes underlying the decision to pay a bribe. For example, if distinguishing between 
different types of bribes undermines rule of law, it would be interesting to examine whether 
creating legal distinctions can change the intrinsic moral costs associated with different types of 
bribery. Relatedly, while the legal system recognizes moral gradation from a primarily 
consequentialist perspective it does not recognize the ambiguity that arises from competing 
ethical commitments. In light of this, the issue for legal scholars, is whether (and how) the 
behavioral findings of Dungan et al. and Sevallino et al. should impact the legal understanding of 
bribery. We believe that policy makers could benefit substantially by research that explores these 
different dimensions. 
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